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Cyber Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky 
 
Randal C. Picker* 
 
The Internet is an almost-organic mix of actors and their machines, an eclectic 
scheme of government and private-decision-making, of non-profits and for-profits. As in 
any integrated system, my choices affect your life in a very direct way. So “Zombie PC 
Army Responsible for Big-Name Web Blackout” sounds like a headline from a bad Hol-
lywood B-movie, when instead it means that computer users could not access the web-
sites of Apple, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo because a Trojan horse program—which, 
by definition, had been placed surreptitiously on thousands of personal computers, turn-
ing those machines into zombie computers under the control of their cyber-master—
launched a simultaneous attack on a key piece of the domain name system infrastructure.1 
Here we have perhaps one bad actor, thousands of sloppy computer users and external-
ities galore. 
Taking down prominent websites is one way for a malicious computer programmer to 
seek fame (perhaps infamy), but spam provides perhaps a more meaningful way in which 
the day-to-day computer experience is degraded by our shared network decisions. Some 
estimates suggest that 80% of spam arises from zombie machines.2 Many of these are 
residential PCs with broadband hook ups. Why? This is the dark-side of Yochai 
Benkler’s work on shareable goods.3 From the consumer’s perspective, both the PC and 
the broadband connection are shareable goods. Given the lumpiness of processing power, 
the average PC user has power to spare. This makes it easy for users to contribute com-
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1 See Robert Lemos and Jim Hu, “Zombie PC army responsible for big name web blackout,” CNET News.com, 
June 17, 2004 (available at http://software.silicon.com/malware/0,3800003100,39121439,00.htm).  
2 See “Trend analysis: Spam Trojans and their impact on broadband service providers,” Sandvine Inc., June 2004 
(available at http://www.sandvine.com/solutions/pdfs/spam_trojan_trend_analysis.pdf). 
3 See Yochai Benkler, “Sharing Nicely”: On shareable goods and the emergence of sharing as a modality of eco-
nomic production (forthcoming, Yale Law Journal, 2004); Yochai Benkler, Peer Production of Survivable Critical 
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puting cycles to seek extraterrestrial life and to other large-scale projects.4 But, at the 
same time, excess cycles can be stolen with little obvious consequence to the computer 
owner. The consumer may experience no real loss when the evil cyber-master enslaves 
the consumer’s PC to devote a chunk of the cycles and broadband connection to spam or 
a denial-of-service attack.5 
But this is driven by more than excess cycles. The spam externality also has arisen 
from important changes in the way in which the network is organized. We moved from 
centralized processing power accessed through distributed dumb terminals (the 1970s) to 
distributed processing power in freestanding PCs (the 1980s) to, with the rise of the 
Internet, highly-interconnected PCs (the 1990s). 1970s centralized processing was cou-
pled with centralized control, a Soviet-style computer architecture. Users were eager to 
control their own destinies and the personal computer made that possible. 
The freestanding PC world that supplanted centralized computing gave rise to few di-
rect externalities, either positive or negative. Viruses could be spread through shared 
floppy disks, but the transactions costs of this type of intercomputer communication were 
sufficiently high that viruses didn’t pose a particularly large problem. Plus a zombie PC 
wasn’t even possible: even if the hacker could figure out how to get malicious software—
malware—onto a floppy and from there to a particular PC, there was no easy way to get 
information or cycles back out. The hacker would have needed physical access to future 
floppies to get content out, a cumbersome arrangement.6 
The rise of the networked PC changed this completely. Email and the web make the 
spread of viruses and bots easy, plus the hacker can initiate access at will to the infected 
machine. This has made the decentralized decisions of end-users much more salient. My 
failure to manage my computer appropriately puts you at risk. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Infrastructures. 
4 Visit the SETI@home webpage to donate cycles (http://setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/).  
5 See The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February, 2003, at 39 (“In recent years, with the spread of 
‘always on’ connections for systems, such as cable modems, digital subscriber lines (DSL), and wireless and satellite 
systems, the security of home user and small business systems has become more important not only to the users them-
selves, but to others to which they are connected through the Internet.). See also “Scotland Yard and the case of the 
rent-a-zombies,” CNET News.com, July 7, 2004 (describing rental of zombie networks—botnets—created by teenage 
hackers) (available at http://news.com.com/2102-7349_3-5260154.html). 
6 For lack of a generally accepted alternative, I use the term “hacker” to refer to a malicious computer program-
mer. I do realize that this use is a bone of contention in some parts of the computer community. For discussion, see 
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All of this has made cyber-security increasingly important. The concept of cyber-
security is sufficiently new that we should draw some lines of demarcation to understand 
what is at stake. Consider three categories that might be encompassed within the notion 
of cyber-security: cyber-vandalism, cyber-crime and cyber-terrorism. Offline vandals 
break windows and deface buildings; online vandals—cyber-vandals—take down web-
sites through denial-of-service attacks or deface websites by having an alternative web-
page load. The Recording Industry Association of America is front-and-center in the re-
cord industry’s effort to combat music downloading and that has made the RIAA’s web-
site a popular target.7 Microsoft is frequently targeted as well.8 Like its offline counter-
part, cyber-vandalism can inflict real costs on its targets. 
Cyber-crime is just crime over the Internet. So “phishing”—the cyber-criminal sends 
a fake email that appears to be from the recipient’s financial institution seeking “re-
confirmation” of financial information—is big business, with a 5 to 20% response rate 
that would make most marketers drool.9 Congress recently made life harder for phishers 
in passing the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act.10 Other approaches to illicitly 
obtaining financial data seek to induce users to download software that sits in the back-
ground and records keystrokes, enabling the criminal to extract credit card information, 
passwords and the like.11 The Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) 
of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice focuses on these issues, 
though other parts of the federal government exercise authority as well.12 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tony Bradley, “What Is In a Name?” (available at http://netsecurity.about.com/cs/generalsecurity/a/aa070303.htm). 
7 See Declan McCullagh, “Recording industry site hit again,” CNET News.com, September 3, 2002 (available at 
http://news.com.com/2102-1023_3-956398.html). 
8 See Jay Lyman, “Denial-of-Service Attack Brings Down Microsoft,” TechNewsWorld, August 4, 2003 (avail-
able at http://www.technewsworld.com/story/31258.html). 
9 Christopher S. Stewart, Fighting Crime One Computer at a Time, The New York Times, June 10, 2004. For 
background, see U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division, Special Report on “Phishing” (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/Phishing.pdf). 
10 P.L. 108-275 (July 15, 2004). 
11 Kevin J. Delaney, “Web-Data Hackers Thwarted, But PCs Are Still Vulnerable,” The Wall Street Journal, June 
28, 2004. 
12 Go to www.cybercrime.gov for info; see also U.S. Secret Service Press Release of September 11, 2003 (PUB 
25-03), “United States Secret Service and Romanian Police Work Together to Solve Major Computer Fraud Investiga-
tion” (describing arrest of Romanian eBay phisher who defrauded Americans of $500,000) (available at 
http://www.secretservice.gov/press/pub2503.pdf). 
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We might distinguish cyber-vandalism and cyber-crime from cyber-terrorism, even 
though these lines aren’t particularly clean.13 We should probably define terrorism before 
defining cyber-terrorism. The legislation creating the Department of Homeland Security 
defines separately both “terrorism” and “an act of terrorism.” The “act of terrorism” defi-
nition focuses on any act that “uses or attempts to use instrumentalities, weapons or other 
methods designed or intended to cause mass destruction, injury or other loss to citizens of 
institutions of the United States.”14 A cyber version of that might overlap with notions of 
cyber-vandalism or cyber-crime. In contrast, the “terrorism” definition looks to acts di-
rected at human life, critical infrastructure or key resources where the motive is politi-
cal.15 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, issued by the White House in Febru-
ary, 2003, focuses on “threat[s] of organized cyber attacks capable of causing debilitating 
disruption to our Nation’s critical infrastructures, economy or national security.”16 
Within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the recently-created National Cy-
ber Security Division focuses on the ways in which cyber-security implicates key infra-
structure.17 In January, 2004, the NCSD launched its National Cyber Alert System,18 
which builds on the prior work of the CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie-Mellon.19 I 
grabbed at random a cyber-security bulletin: it opened with a 25-page list of software 
vulnerabilities identified between May 12, 2004 and May 25, 2004.20 Ten days, 25 pages. 
Who is on this list of infamy? To choose just a handful of prominent names: Apache, 
Apple, BEA Systems, Eudora, GNU, Hewlett Packard, KDE, the Linux kernel, Micro-
                                                 
13 And might not even distinguish cyber-vandalism from cyber-crime. See Neal Katyal, The Dark Side of Private 
Ordering: The Network\Community Harm of Crime.” 
14 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), § 865; see also 6 CFR 25.9 (definition of 
“act of terrorism”). 
15 Id at. § 2 (“appears to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy 
of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assas-
sination or kidnapping”). 
16 The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, supra note 5, at viii. 
17 See “Ridge Creates New Division to Combat Cyber Threats,” U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Press Release 
of June 6, 2003 (available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=52&content=918).  
18 See “U.S. Department of Homeland Security Improves America’s Cyber Security Preparedness – Unveils Na-
tional Cyber Alert System,” Press Release of Jan. 28, 2004 (available at http://www.us-cert.gov/press_room/cas-
announced.html).  
19 See www.cert.org.  
20 US-CERT Cyber Security Bulletin, SB04-147, May 26, 2004 (available at  
http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/body/bulletins/SB04-147.pdf).  
Picker Cyber Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky 5 
soft, Netscape, Novell, Opera, Sun and Symantec. This list covers both commercial and 
open-source software, companies with dominant and used-to-be dominant market posi-
tions, PCs and micro-computers. And it is not the sheer number of vulnerabilities alone 
that is problematic: the time between knowledge of the vulnerability and exploitation by 
a hacker is dropping, as hackers pursue the zero-day exploit (no gap between knowledge 
of the vulnerability and malware that exploits it).21 
We need to figure out how to deal with this systematic cyber-insecurity. The problem 
arises from underlying architecture of the system, as implemented in the joint decisions 
of hardware makers and software creators; from the malware creators themselves; and 
from the aggregate consequences of many individual decisions made by end-users. We 
have a number of possible targets and instruments to work with. 
The hackers themselves are the most natural target, and we clearly will pursue them, 
but they can be quite elusive. We might consider end-users themselves. After all, their 
infected machines do much of the work of the system: take those machines off of the sys-
tem and the hackers will be deprived of one of their most valuable resources. And end-
users repeatedly create problems by clicking on executable email attachments. Think of 
end-users as engaging in negligent computer set-up or negligent computer use. In a paral-
lel setting, the RIAA has sued consumers for copyright violations tied to uploading and 
downloading music. The RIAA switched to this approach after it was frustrated in its ef-
forts to hold liable KaZaA and other creators of file-sharing software.22 
Internet service providers are another natural target. As critical intermediaries in the 
network, they are operationally situated to intervene in the working of the network. The 
institutional structure matters too. The always-on, one-price all-you-can-eat structure for 
consumer broadband means that end-users pay no attention to how bandwidth is used. I 
have no reason to pay attention when a hacker turns my home broadband-enabled PC into 
a zombie. 
                                                 
21 David Rink, “Computer Worm is Turning Faster,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2004. 
22 See John Borland, “RIAA sues 261 file swappers,” CNET News.com, September 8, 2003 (available at 
http://news.com.com/2102-1023_3-5072564.html).  
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I will not consider the position of end-users or of internet service providers.23 Instead, 
I want to consider two inquiries regarding how we manage cyber insecurity: (i) the 
monoculture argument, which favors forced heterogeneity in operating systems, and (ii) 
the ways in which liability rules influence software. First, the software adoption choices 
of individual users create a software infrastructure against which hackers operate. One 
prominent argument—dubbed the “monoculture” argument—suggests that the collective 
choice is flawed, even if the individual choices are perfectly sensible. These individual 
choices have led to a Microsoft Windows monopoly in personal computer operating sys-
tems. According to the claim, the Microsoft operating system monopoly creates a harm-
ful monoculture—a common code base through which computer viruses spread easily 
putting the computing network at risk.24 
I consider the monoculture argument’s focus on forced heterogeneity as a means of 
creating redundancy in our integrated computer network. I believe that forced heteroge-
neity would be quite expensive and that we would be better suited to focus on autarky, 
meaning here the conditions under which individual computers or internal systems within 
a firm should be isolated from the rest of the public network. That is already a standard 
cyber-security practice, and one frequently associated with the management of critical 
assets. Heterogeneity and autarky are substitutes in pursuing redundancy, but I think that 
there is a decided advantage for autarky in protecting key assets. 
Second, I consider the overall question of software quality, since the implicit (ex-
plicit?) premise of the monoculture work is not merely that we have a software monocul-
ture, but that it is also a particularly bad one. I consider the way in which liability rules—
understood generally to include as a family insurance (contractual liability), warranties 
(more contracts) and torts—might influence software quality. Full-blown liability would 
help solve a software adoption version of the prisoner’s dilemma—each user wants the 
other user to adopt early and get the bugs out of the system—but would also introduce 
                                                 
23 For views on the potential liability of the latter, see Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service 
Providers Accountable. 
24 D. Geer et al, CyberInsecurity: The Cost of Monopoly (Sept. 24, 2003) (available at 
http://www.ccianet.org/papers/cyberinsecurity.pdf). For discussion, see Justin Pope, “Biology stirs Microsoft monocul-
ture debate,” Salon.com, Feb. 15, 2004; James A. Whittaker, “No Clear Answers on Monoculture Issues,” IEEE Secu-
rity & Privacy, Nov./Dec., 2003; “Warning: Microsoft ‘Monoculture’”, Associated Press, Feb. 15, 2004 (available at 
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,62307,00.html).   
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standard adverse selection problems. Voluntary contractual liability—a warranty to some 
customers—would mitigate those problems while permitting a natural improvement of 
software over time. 
I. Redundancy: Heterogeneity vs. Autarky 
Sometimes it seems it is almost impossible to pay too much attention to Microsoft. As 
perhaps the leading firm of the Information Age, Microsoft is everywhere, an unavoid-
able fact in the daily life of every computer user. Windows, Office and Internet Explorer 
are ubiquitous, with market shares to die for (and many competing products have done 
just that). Yes, Linux chips away on the desktop and cell phones grow more powerful 
each day, but for the foreseeable future—say the next decade—there is every reason to 
think that Microsoft will continue to define the computing experience of most users. 
Monopoly inevitably brings attention. Good students of U.S. antitrust law understand 
that Judge Learned Hand’s famous statement on monopoly—“The successful competitor, 
having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins”25—is at best a 
half-truth. We will scrutinize winners to make absolutely sure that they dot their Sherman 
Act i’s and cross their Clayton Act t’s. I know less about European competition policy, 
but we all know that Microsoft has received the most exacting attention on both sides of 
the Atlantic for more than a decade.26 
The governments have focused on the competition policy consequences of Micro-
soft’s monopolies. These are the usual issues of antitrust: Are prices too high? Has com-
petition on the merits been squelched? Has output been reduced? These inquiries have 
                                                 
25 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2nd Cir. 1945) (“A single producer may be the 
survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. In such 
cases a strong argument can be made that, although the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act 
does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. 
The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”) 
26 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ordering federal district court to approve July 
15, 1994 settlement between the United States and Microsoft regarding licensing practices for Windows and DOS); 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (unanimously affirming district court finding 
of illegal monopoly maintenance under Section 2 of the Sherman Act); Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Microsoft 
Corp., 2004 WL 1462298 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (affirming district court approval of settlement agreement among certain 
states, the United States and Microsoft); Commission of the European Communities, Commission Decision of 
24.03.2004 (COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft) (finding an abuse of a dominant position in refusing to disclose certain 
interoperability information for servers and in condition acquisition of Windows on simultaneous acquisition of the 
Windows Media Player). For my views on the most recent U.S. antitrust case against Microsoft, see Randal C. Picker, 
Pursuing a Remedy in Microsoft: The Declining Need for Centralized Coordination in a Networked World, 158 Jour-
nal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 113 (2002). 
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not focused on the security consequences of monopoly, but others have rushed in to fill 
the void. The most visible strain of this analysis is the “monoculture” argument, namely 
that the Microsoft operating system monopoly creates a harmful monoculture—a com-
mon code base through which computer viruses spread easily putting the computing net-
work at risk.27 The National Science Foundation is pouring $750,000 into funding re-
search on ways of creating cyber-diversity, one possible antidote to the monoculture.28 
A. Monocultures: Supply v. Demand 
Consider one formulation of the monoculture argument:  
Most of the world’s computers run Microsoft’s operating systems, thus most 
of the world’s computers are vulnerable to the same viruses and worms at the 
same time. The only way to stop this is to avoid monoculture in computer op-
erating systems, and for reasons just as reasonable and obvious as avoiding 
monoculture in farming. Microsoft exacerbates this problem via a wide range 
of practices that lock users to its platform. The impact on security of this lock-
in is real and endangers society.29 
This argument builds off of other work that draws out the analogy between farming—
and in particular cotton growing—and computer software.30 That work suggests that in 
the early 20th century U.S., a cotton “monoculture” had emerged, that only one strain of 
cotton was grown and that too much acreage was devoted to cotton, especially given the 
risks posed by the boll weevil. The presumptive solution to monoculture is diversifica-
tion, presumably meaning here that farmers shifted fields from cotton to other crops. 
Now I must confess that my knowledge of cotton is limited to thread counts and the 
supposed virtues of Pima, Supima and Egyptian cotton for sheets (definitely go with the 
Egyptian), so I am not particularly well situated to make claims about cotton growing in 
the U.S. in the 1920s to 1940s. But a brief incursion into the world of cotton suggests that 
the analysis is tricky. Consider the most direct suggestion about boll weevil devastation 
and diversification. The boll weevil spread throughout the U.S. cotton belt during thirty 
years, from roughly 1892 in the southern tip of Texas to 1922 in north-eastern North 
                                                 
27 See Geer et al, supra note 24. 
28 See National Science Foundation Press Release, “Taking Cues from Mother Nature to Foil Cyber Attacks,” 
Nov. 25, 2003 (available at http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/news/03/pr03130.htm).  
29 Geer et al, supra note 24, at 7. 
30 John S. Quarterman, Monoculture Considered Harmful, First Monday, February, 2002 (available at 
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Carolina.31 Between 1866 and 1892, harvested cotton acreage rose from 7,666,000 acres 
to 18,896,000 acres.32 Between 1892 and 1922, while the boll weevil worked its way 
across the Cotton belt, harvested cotton acreage rose to 31,361,000 acres. The number of 
bales produced rose as well, from 6.7 million bales in 1892 to 10.1 million in 1922. As a 
group, farmers were not exiting cotton growing at all, quite the opposite. 
We can also look at the data slightly differently. Between 1909 and 1933 in the 
United States, cotton’s share of planted acres fluctuates, but there is barely any net 
movement between 1909 (10.57%) and 1933 (10.78%).33 Cotton does decline relatively 
during the Depression and World War II, and I don’t begin to understand why that is, but 
it seems hard to trace any of this to the boll weevil.34 While the boll weevil was spread-
ing, cotton acreage was increasing in absolute terms and cotton held its own as measured 
against other crops until 1933. We dealt with the weevil by switching to early blooming 
cotton varieties35 and by moving production to less humid locations.36 
Now one might say that this just makes the monoculture point, that switching varie-
ties or growing on different land is an example of heterogeneity in action.37 But I think 
that the point is slightly different. The real point is about the cost of generating variety 
and how quickly adaptations can be made. Think of the point this way: do we need to 
have an existing stock of varieties in place to be drawn upon at the point where the domi-
nant variety has been found to be wanting or does it suffice to implement just-in-time va-
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue7_2/quarterman/). 
31 See Harry Bates Brown & Jacob Osborn Ware, Cotton 203 (3rd ed. 1958). 
32 Historical Track Records, U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, April, 
2004, pp. 27-30. 
33 This is calculated using the data series for all planted crops, id. at 5, and the comparable series for cotton, id at. 
28. 
34 If the numbers are right—and they are sufficiently dramatic that they are difficult to believe—the change in 
U.S cotton industry in one year was startling. In 1932, roughly 36.5 million acres of cotton were planted and 35.9 mil-
lion were harvested. In 1933, the corresponding figures were 40.2 million and 29.3 million. And in 1934, the figures 
were 27.8 million and 26.8 million. In one season, the harvested numbers fell through the floor and plantings tracked 
that going forward. And it is unlikely that the change in harvested cotton in 1933 was due to the boll weevil or disease: 
productivity per harvested acres actually rose from 173.5 lbs. in 1932 to 212.7 lbs. in 1933 (presumably in part as a 
result of only harvesting the most productive fields). Id. at 28. 
35 Basil G. Christidis & George J. Harrison, Cotton Growing Problems 506 (1955). 
36 Brown & Ware, supra note 31, at 202. 
37 Neil Katyal made this point in his oral remarks on his paper at the conference. 
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riety, variety when and as we need it? This is a point about the speed of adaptation in the 
face of a threat. 
But there is a more basic problem with the monoculture idea, at least in farming. For 
the individual farmer, growing multiple crops is a way of self-insuring against the failure 
of any one crop. Self-insurance may be sensible if more direct insurance markets are un-
der-developed or aren’t sustainable for any of the standard reasons that insurance markets 
are difficult to establish (adverse selection and moral hazard, for example). But funda-
mentally, the monoculture idea says nothing about how much cotton should be grown. 
While individual farmers might want to grow a mix of cotton and corn to self-insure 
against the boll weevil, we shouldn’t grow corn if no consumer wants it. 
The cotton-corn trade off is a great example of the difference between supply-side 
and demand-side substitutes. Cotton and corn might be supply-side substitutes for the 
individual farmer—grow one, grow the other, grow both (but also might not be, as we 
clearly just shifted cotton production across states). But for the consumer, cotton and 
corn are poor substitutes: we do not see magazines extolling the virtues of corn-silk 
sheets and no one suggests that you serve cotton as a side dish at your next July 4th cele-
bration. The monoculture notion completely ignores consumer demand: it is a supply-
side production idea tailored to the individual farmer for use when insurance markets are 
incomplete. 
B. Heterogeneity and Autarky 
Those concerned about monoculture might respond to this by noting that individually 
rational decisions can be collectively foolish. In choosing a computer and an operating 
system, the individual may take into account some of the externalities associated with 
computers. So computer software is frequently discussed as having network externalities: 
for example, I benefit when other users have the same software, as it makes it easier for 
us to swap documents. Sheer number of users can give rise to less direct network exter-
nalities, as many users will support a greater variety of software. 
Individual users probably pay little attention to whether they should seek to contrib-
ute to software diversity by using software that runs against the mainstream. Some indi-
viduals may value difference and choose accordingly and that would have the same con-
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sequence for increasing diversity in the installed base of computers. In contrast, large-
scale choosers might be more sensitive to diversity benefits. They might seek to mini-
mize the chance of a correlated failure of their computer systems by sprinkling pockets of 
Linux and Macs in a Windows-dominant population. 
This means, in an almost a double-negative fashion, that the disconnect between the 
monoculture argument and what consumers want shouldn’t necessarily be dispositive 
against the monoculture argument. But there is another set of arguments to consider, in 
particular those organized around the ideas of interconnection and autarky. Interconnec-
tion is the great issue of modern network industries. We impose connection obligations 
on firms that control key bottleneck facilities and seek ways to simplify how those con-
nections are made. So, to take quick examples: 
• Electricity. As electricity generation ceased to be subject to substantial economies 
of scale, we moved to encourage merchant generation by imposing an open access 
regime on the electricity grid. Vertically-integrated grid owner/generators 
wouldn’t be able to advantage their own generation over competing outside gen-
eration.38 
• Telecommunications. To switch from electricity to phones, under the Telecom-
munications Act of 1996, we imposed on telephone incumbents three key sharing 
obligations: they must interconnect with entrants, so that new customers of en-
trants can call the incumbent’s customers; an entrant can buy telcom services 
from incumbents at wholesale prices for resale to the customers of the entrant; 
and, most onerous, entrants can mix and match pieces of the incumbent’s network 
and other facilities at cost-based prices under the unbundled network elements re-
gime.39 
• Windows. Interconnection is not only the dominant issue in traditional physical 
network industries. How the Windows operating system interconnected with other 
software was one of the key issues in the antitrust actions brought by the United 
                                                 
Telecommunications: Iowa Utilities and Verizon, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41 (2003). 
38 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Pub-
lic Utilities, 61 FR 21540, 21544 (1996), substantially affirmed sub. nom. Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. 
FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), affirmed sub. nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
39 47 USC § 251(d)(2). For discussion, see Douglas Lichtman & Randal C. Picker, Entry Policy in Local 
12  August 12, 2004 
States and the European Union against Microsoft. The consensual final judgment 
between the U.S. and Microsoft requires Microsoft to make available to third par-
ties certain communications protocols to facilitate communications between third-
party software and Windows.40 The European Union case focused on two issues: 
bundling of the Windows Media Player with Windows and server interoperability, 
meaning, how well do computer servers communicate with Windows? 
But as we should have guessed, there is a real downside to all of this connectivity: 
problems percolate quickly throughout an interconnected system, and problems that 
might have been just local disturbances end up everywhere. The August 14, 2003 power 
blackout in Canada and large chunks of the Eastern United States, which affected nearly 
50 million people, emphasized again how a local problem—here overgrown trees in 
Northern Ohio—could spillover throughout the electricity grid.41 
The monoculture is another name for a homogenous, connected system. In the mono-
culture framework, heterogeneity is used as a barrier to the spread of a virus throughout a 
connected computer system. The anti-monoculture idea also taps into our sense of neces-
sary biodiversity. It is reasonably straightforward to articulate possible benefits of biodi-
versity and to simulate those in a simple environment.42 Systems without sufficient diver-
sity can be very brittle, especially as conditions change. An adaptation poorly matched to 
one environment may become the dominant adaptation as the environment changes. 
But heterogeneity isn’t equivalent to redundancy: if the University of Chicago Law 
School used only Windows computers, while Yale Law School used only Macintoshes, a 
Windows-only virus would decimate Chicago, and while Yale could continue to produce 
text, we know that the world would be a very different place without the Chicago papers. 
                                                                                                                                                 
communications: Iowa Utilities and Verizon, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41 (2003). 
40 Final Judgment, ¶ III.E (available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.htm).  
41 U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 2003 Blackout in the United 
States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations p. 45 (April, 2004) (“After 15:05 EDT, some of [FirstEnergy]’s 345-
kV transmission lines began tripping out because the lines were contacting overgrown trees within the lines’ right-of-
way areas. … The loss of the Sammis-Star line triggered the cascade because it shut down the 345-kV path into north-
ern Ohio from eastern Ohio. Although the area around Akron, Ohio was already blacked out due to earlier events, most 
of northern Ohio remained interconnected and electricity demand was high. This meant that the loss of the heavily 
overloaded Sammis-Star line instantly created major and unsustainable burdens on lines in adjacent areas, and the cas-
cade spread rapidly as lines and generating units automatically tripped by protective relay action to avoid physical 
damage.”) 
42 See Randal C. Picker, SimLaw 2011, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1019 (2002). 
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As this example suggests, we can achieve redundancy through heterogeneity only if we 
have done a good job of matching the level of heterogeneity with the level of unique as-
sets. So if Stanford Law School and Yale Law School are good substitutes, we could af-
ford to have each school specialize in a computer operating system, so long as each spe-
cialized on a different operating system. In contrast, to ensure that we don’t lose Chicago 
scholarship—a unique asset in the system in my world!—my Law School needs to create 
heterogeneity internally (most dramatically, my colleagues Richard Epstein and Cass 
Sunstein should each have at least one Windows machine, one Linux box and a Macin-
tosh to ensure that not a single moment of writing time is lost). 
And the last example suggests some of the complexities of using heterogeneity to 
achieve redundancy. How would we ensure that substitutes use different operating sys-
tems? Across-firm heterogeneity might arise spontaneously, as might be the case if we 
had two substantial choices, with perhaps a 60/40 market share. But unless the differenti-
ated inputs are an important part of production—can you really write better papers on a 
Macintosh?—we shouldn’t expect substitutes at the firm level to necessarily choose dif-
ferent substitutes in inputs, here different operating systems. 
But heterogeneity may be a particularly clumsy approach to redundancy. Take two 
steps back on our path: we went from monoculture as connected homogenous computers 
to looking at a system of connected heterogeneous computers. Maybe we just need to 
sever the connection, to isolate computers and to head towards an autarkic computer net-
work. Think Tom Cruise and the first Mission Impossible movie: Ving Rhames can’t just 
hack into the CIA computer at Langley to get the NOC list, because the computer isn’t on 
the network, so Tom has to dive in and hang from the ceiling. 
Embracing isolation—disconnection or autarky—breaks the modern pattern of net-
work industries. But interconnection is not always good and we need to focus on an op-
timal amount of interconnection. These are obviously not new points to professionals 
whose job is to engineer safety. So the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has regulations 
that address how safety-related computer systems need to be isolated or send-only.43 At 
                                                 
43 See “NRC Issues Information Notice on Potential of Nuclear Power Plant to Worm Infection,” NRC Press Re-
lease No. 03-108 (September 2, 2003). 
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the same time, the regulatory push towards electricity generator neutrality is precisely 
about making better information available to outsiders about the state of the transmission 
grid. If done poorly, however, requiring interconnections for competitive purposes may 
create security problems.44 
The extent of autarky is a choice, and in some cases, we have reduced the degree of 
autarky in critical systems by moving more communications onto the public Internet. In 
many critical infrastructure industries, equipment is operated and assessed through 
SCADA systems (supervisory control and data acquisition systems). The SCADA system 
are the eyes-and-ears of these systems, and systems that once ran on closed, isolated net-
works—autarkic networks—are migrating to the Internet.45 Moving control systems back 
to separate communications networks—so-called “out-of-band” management—is one of 
the approaches being considered by government officials to enhance cyber security.46 
So here is the question: should we buy redundancy through heterogeneity or through 
autarky (isolated systems)? Heterogeneity and autarky are substitutes, but quite imperfect 
substitutes. At an abstract level, we would need to do a social cost-benefit analysis on the 
costs of redundancy as compared to our tolerance for downtime and then figure out the 
different ways in which we might implement the same level of redundancy. 
Try this: we can have ten connected computers running different operating systems or 
ten isolated computers running Windows. We know that it is cheap to make the next 
computer, quite expensive to make the next operating system. Meaningful variety in con-
nected computers is quite expensive, if that means creating different operating systems. 
This is expensive redundancy. Simply creating the operating systems would be quite ex-
pensive; adding the associated software ecosystems—the actual application programs 
that do something—would make the costs extraordinarily high. In contrast, we can isolate 
ten computers running the same operating system for next to nothing. And of course this 
                                                 
44 See National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, Information Assurance Task Force, Electric 
Power Risk Assessment (“Although not all utilities have an interface between the control center and the corporate in-
formation system, the distinct trend within the industry is to link the systems to access control center data necessary for 
business purposes. One utility interviewed considered the business value of access to the data within the control center 
worth the risk of open connections between the control center and the corporate network.”) (available at 
http://www.ncs.gov/n5_hp/Reports/EPRA/electric.html).  
45 National Strategy to Secured Cyberspace, supra note 5, at 32. 
46 Id. at 31. See also Robert Lemos, “Sprint touts off-Net networks,” CNET News.com, July 22, 2004 (available 
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overstates the cost of autarkic redundancy. Software and data have a zero marginal cost 
and computer infections don’t affect monitors and CPUs. We are really talking about re-
dundant hard disks, and even an infected hard disk can be wiped clean and reused.47 
Autarky works best for critical infrastructure, where we can invest the resources re-
quired to have isolation and parallel independent communication paths. Autarky ad-
dresses cyber-terrorism, but autarky makes little sense to dealing with cyber-crime. We 
cannot very well tell Amazon.com to take its servers off the network to “solve” its cyber-
crime problems. Amazon lives and dies on the state of the public network. But Amazon 
also is a good example of the distinction between critical and non-critical assets. I would 
find it disruptive if Amazon were offline for a month, but we have many good substitutes 
for Amazon (BN.com, physical bookstores, books that I already own, libraries). Take the 
electricity system offline for a month, and much of our current infrastructure—almost of 
all which runs off of electricity—starts to break down. 
C. The Cost of Engineering Heterogeneity 
We can now circle back to the core remedies suggested in the monoculture literature, 
namely, mandatory porting of Office and Internet Explorer to other platforms and a 50% 
cap on the market share of Windows: 
• “Instead, Microsoft should be required to support a long list of applications (Mi-
crosoft Office, Internet Explorer, plus their server applications and development 
tools) on a long list of platforms. Microsoft should either be forbidden to release 
Office for any one platform, like Windows, until it releases Linux and Mac OS X 
versions of the same tools that are widely considered to have feature parity, com-
patibility, and so forth.”48 
                                                                                                                                                 
at http://news.com.com/2102-7355_3-5280148.html).  
47 And, for better or worse, the telecommunications bubble has created much redundant infrastructure, making it 
much cheaper now to create separate, isolated communications networks, with some estimates suggesting that only 3% 
of the fiber in the ground is being used. See Yochi J. Dreazen, “Behind the Fiber Glut,” The Wall Street Journal, Sep-
tember 26, 2002. 
48 See Geer et al, supra note 24, at 18. 
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• “A requirement that no operating system be more than 50% of the installed base 
in a critical industry or in a government would moot monoculture risk.”49 
Mandatory porting of Office to “a long list of platforms” is an almost certainly an ex-
traordinarily expensive way to seek heterogeneity, and one with no assurance of achiev-
ing the end in mind. Microsoft would be required to invest resources in creating a Linux 
version of Windows independent of any possible consideration of the economic returns 
from doing so. This remedy was suggested in the remedial phase of the U.S. antitrust 
case and was squarely rejected by the government “as far beyond the violations found.”50 
So we won’t impose a mandatory porting obligation as an antitrust remedy. And, in 
Trinko, the Supreme Court recently narrowed the circumstances under which a dominant 
firm might have an independent antitrust duty to deal with a rival, so we won’t get port-
ing through antitrust.51 This would require federal legislation and that would raise other 
issues. The possible Taking Clause claims associated with the duty-to-deal obligations in 
telecommunications and electricity have never been fully litigated, and a porting obliga-
tion might be far more onerous than those obligations. 
It also might not work and this takes us back to the cotton-corn discussion. Consum-
ers might continue to purchase Windows even with Office ported to Linux. After all, Of-
fice has been available on the Mac OS for sometime and we don’t see consumers heading 
in droves to the Mac. Office is just one piece—a key piece to be sure—of the Windows 
ecosystem. 
But the point of the second remedy—limiting the market share of Windows to 50% in 
critical industries—is to make sure that other OSs thrive when they would not otherwise. 
Assume that we can surmount the question of which industries are critical—though we 
                                                 
49 Id. at 19. 
50 See Response of the United States to Public Comments on The Revised Proposed Final Judgment ¶¶ 433-34 
(February 27, 2002) (“The Court of Appeals did not find that Microsoft’s unlawful actions created the barrier to entry. 
The United States crafted the [Revised Proposed Final Judgment] to restore the competitive conditions in the market 
that were impeded by Microsoft’s actions, allowing consumers, software developers, OEMs, and others to make deci-
sions based on the competitive merit of their options. In this way, the market will determine whether particular prod-
ucts will erode the applications barrier to entry. The commentors’ and Litigating States’ proposal, however, goes far 
beyond the violations found by imposing on the market a porting requirement for Office that substitutes for competi-
tion on the merits and preordains the market outcome.”) 
51 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S.Ct. 872 (2004). 
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have struggled with that question for as long as we have had regulated industries52—and 
turn to the merits of the proposal. Given the advantages of autarky over heterogeneity, we 
should be focusing on the marginal benefit that we would achieve in a more heterogene-
ous environment. 
How many operating systems would we need to mitigate the monoculture problem? If 
we were a bi-culture or a tri-culture, would that be sufficient? Unsurprisingly, Microsoft 
believes otherwise having taken the position that a truly diverse operating system culture 
would require thousands of operating systems.53 The 50% cap in the monoculture litera-
ture is just asserted without any reason being offered to believe that the limit would actu-
ally be effective. 
And to take the cyber-security question seriously, we need to switch from sport hack-
ers seeking an idiosyncratic version of fame if not fortune, to cyber-terrorists intent upon 
taking down key infrastructure. Sport hackers probably just seek attention and dislike 
Microsoft, so for them, Windows is the natural target. As other operating systems grew in 
market share, they might become attractive targets as well.54 
Dedicated cyber-terrorists would take into account the organization of the network 
and the number of operating systems at work.55 A cascading failure—a failure that starts 
with one node and propagates out throughout the network as loads are redistributed—is 
most likely to occur if the loads are distributed unevenly across the network and the node 
that fails first has a relatively high load.56 An attacker seeking to bring down the entire 
system—power grid or Internet, for example—might naturally concentrate her attack on 
                                                 
52 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (considering whether ice business in Oklahoma was a 
public business and therefore appropriately subject to state regulation). 
53 Warning, supra note 24 (“[Scott Charney, chief security strategist for Microsoft] says monoculture theory 
doesn’t suggest any reasonable solutions; more use of the Linux-source operating system, a rival to Microsoft Win-
dows, might create a ‘duoculture,’ but that would hardly deter sophisticated hackers. True diversity, Charney said, 
would require thousands of different operating systems, which would make integrating computer systems and networks 
nearly impossible. Without a Microsoft monoculture, he said, most of the recent progress in information technology 
could not have happened.”) 
54 Whittaker, supra note 24. 
55 Hackers already write malware that infects across multiple platforms. See, e.g., the description of the Virus 
{Win32,Linux}/Simile.D available at http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/linux.simile.html.  
56 Adilson E. Motter & Ying-Cheung Lai, Cascade-based attacks on complex networks, 66 Physical Review E 
065102(R) (2002). 
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key nodes, perhaps the root servers in the case of the Internet.57 And a cyber-attack that 
relied on congestion, as occurs in a typical denial-of-service attack,58 would almost cer-
tainly seek to exploit any substantial operating system. 
In sum, I see little reason to think that a strategy of forced heterogeneity in operating 
systems would yield meaningful returns at any acceptable cost. This really would be 
market engineering of a particular sort, and would seem to have more traditional re-
sponses available that will do a better job of creating meaningful redundancy and cyber-
security. We have frequently isolated networks from other networks—a strategy of 
disconnection or autarky—and I see little reason to think that we should not continue that 
policy in preference to a strategy of forced heterogeneity. 
 
II. Understanding Computer Software Product Quality 
If we are likely to continue to have a monoculture in operating systems—and not just 
in operating systems, as, for example, Cisco’s market share of high-end routers has been 
running in the 65 to 70% range59—what, if anything, can the legal system do to improve 
software quality? Microsoft gets a lot of attention, but as the Department of Homeland 
Security’s cyber security bulletins make clear, Microsoft isn’t the only company that 
produces software with vulnerabilities, far from it in fact. For me, at least, the more rele-
vant question is what is the relationship between software quality and the liability rules 
that relate to it? And what should be the source of the liability rules: voluntary contract, 
default or mandatory warranties tied to contract, or perhaps tort? 
We should start with a typical Microsoft End User License Agreement, the basic con-
tract between Microsoft and those using its software. Microsoft disclaims all warranties 
to the maximum extent permitted by law, seeks to limit any possible damages and seeks 
to limit any other possible remedies.60 For Microsoft to be held liable for software de-
fects, an end-user would have to surmount these contractual barriers. Of course, produc-
                                                 
57 See Whittaker, supra note 24, at 2. 
58 See, e.g., CERT Advisory CA-1998-01 Smurf IP Denial-of-Service Attacks. 
59 Marquerite Reardon, “Cisco bets on new high-end router,” CNET News.com, May 24, 2004 (available at 
http://news.com.com/2102-1033_3-5218356.html).  
60 See End-User License Agreement for Microsoft Software § 8 (available at 
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ers have been disclaiming warranties for some time but only with limited success in the 
face of judges willing to expand tort doctrines of product liability. In Henningsen v. 
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,61 the New Jersey Supreme Court ran right over a warranty dis-
claimer, in, as my colleague Richard Epstein puts it, “inaugerat[ing] the modern age of 
products liability.62 
Torts liability here would be especially tricky, as we will frequently have three par-
ties to consider: Microsoft, as producer of the software; the hacker, who has created the 
virus or worm; and the harmed end-user, who very well may have contributed to the 
harm by clicking when he shouldn’t have done so. We would need to sort through com-
plex tort doctrines relating to causality, the intervention of third parties and basic ques-
tions regarding strict liability, negligence and contributory negligence. These are not sure 
winners for Microsoft, as key infrastructure providers have been held liable even in the 
face of malicious acts by third parties that might naturally be understood to be the actual 
source of the harm. So the railroad was held liable in Brauer when it struck a horse-
drawn wagon and thieves made off with empty barrels and a keg of cider.63 And Consoli-
dated Edison was held liable for damages resulting from looting and vandalism when its 
gross negligence allowed the lights to go out in New York City in 1977.64 But these is-
sues, while critical for anyone seeking to impose liability on software providers, are not 
my target here and I will instead consider how liability rules influence software quality 
and software adoption decisions. 
A. Consumer Software Adoption with Full Liability 
Start with a system of full liability: Microsoft would be liable for the harms that result 
from its products. With full liability, how would consumer behavior change? A key issue 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.gotdotnet.com/team/clr/samples/eula_clr_cryptosrc.aspx).  
61 161 A.2d 69 (1960). 
62 Richard A. Epstein, Modern Products Liability Law 50 (1980). To put it mildly, Richard is skeptical of the path 
launched by Henningsen: “However popular the Henningsen approach might be today, it remains clearly flawed in all 
its essentials.” Id. at 53 (footnote omitted). For additional discussion in the context of software, see Peter A. Alces, 
W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability Theory in Cases of Deficient Software Design, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 
269, 287-88 (1999). 
63 Brauer v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co., 103 A. 166 (N.J. Ct. Errors and Appeals, 1918). 
64 Food Pagent, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 429 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1981); Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co. 
of New York, Inc., 468 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984). 
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for consumers of software is what version of a product to purchase. Street “wisdom” has 
it that Microsoft doesn’t get its products right until at least the third version, so a prudent 
user may wait before jumping in. When Microsoft issues a new version of Windows, you 
are frequently advised to wait until the first service pack is issued before embracing the 
new operating system. In each case, the consumer trades off the benefits of the new prod-
uct against the costs of that product. Those costs include the actual purchase price, the 
hassle of making changes but also should include the expected costs associated with 
buggy software. Buggy software costs include downtime from software that works 
poorly, the cost of installing frequent patches and the possible costs of a hacker harming 
your computer system. 
A consumer compares the benefits of the new software against these costs in making 
a purchase/installation decision. These benefits and costs are private information, known 
only to the individual consumer. Hacker insurance—actual insurance or de facto insur-
ance imposed under the guise of product liability—could change that decision, as the 
consumer would no longer face the hacking costs. Such is the nature of insurance: the 
insured rationally ignores real social costs. As a society, for given software, we want 
consumers to wait for revised software or not install the software at all if the full social 
costs of the software exceed the benefits. 
Mandatory full insurance—put differently, broad products liability—would result in 
over-consumption of the software. In a competitive market, mandatory insurance would 
result in a cross-subsidy from one set of consumers to another. Consider a simple exam-
ple to make this point. 
We have two types of consumers. C1 values the software in question at a benefit of 
$200 and has hacking costs of $0. C2 values the software at $20 and has hacking costs of 
$50. We have 9 C1’s and 1 C2. It costs $50 to make the software and nothing to make 
each copy. Use a zero profit condition to define a competitive outcome. Full costs if all 
ten consumers buy the software are $100. The social benefit from the software is 9*200 + 
20, or 1820 against costs of $100, so we should build the software. If we sell ten copies, 
then a price of $10 per copy would cover the costs of the software. At that price, all ten 
consumers would buy and the net gain from the software would be $1720. 
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But without bundled mandatory insurance we would do better. C2 wouldn’t buy and 
we would have costs of $50, benefits of $1800 and net benefits of $1750. The bundled 
“insurance” is worthless to the C1 type consumers and when required, we have over-
consumption by C2s—a social loss—plus a cross-subsidy running from the C1s to C2 to 
boot. 
B. Quality Investment and Full Liability 
Mandatory insurance affects investment in product quality in a number of interesting 
ways. So, to continue the example, suppose that Microsoft could spend $10 to re-design 
Windows to eliminate all of the hacking costs. From a standpoint of overall social wel-
fare, we would like this to happen: C2 values the software at $20 but faces hacking costs 
of $50. We could eliminate those costs by spending $10. Will Microsoft do so? 
No, at least not if we assume that Microsoft is just selling one product and therefore 
must sell the same quality product to each consumer. Our C1 consumers don’t value the 
higher quality product: they don’t face any hacking costs and would not want to pay a 
penny more for a better product that lowers hacking costs. If Microsoft spent $60 to make 
the software—the original $50 cost, plus the additional $10 to eliminate hacking costs—
then Microsoft would need to charge $6 a copy to cover its costs, assuming that all ten 
consumer bought a copy of Windows. C1s would end up with a net benefit of $194 ($200 
– $6). An operating system entrant facing the same costs could build the $50 version of 
the product and cover its costs selling only to the 9 C1s at a price of $5.55, making the 
C1s better off. (Obviously, if Microsoft could sell two versions of the product it could 
separate the market and it would then make the $10 investment. So low-quality Windows 
would sell for $5, high quality for $15, C1s would buy low and C2 would buy high.) 
How would mandatory insurance change these decisions? Again, if Microsoft sells 
only one version of Windows, mandatory insurance “solves” the quality underinvestment 
problem. Recall how the prior example worked. With bundled insurance, Microsoft’s to-
tal costs were $100, the $50 product cost and the $50 insurance payment for C2’s hack-
ing harms. Microsoft could lower those costs by spending the $10 to eliminate C2’s 
hacking costs, so that total costs dropped to $60. With mandatory insurance, Microsoft 
would do this. 
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So should we think that we have two countervailing effects of mandatory insurance, 
over-consumption by some consumers but better product design decisions by Microsoft? 
Not really. To bring the two examples together, from a social standpoint, we would like 
Microsoft to spend up to $20 to eliminate C2’s hacking costs, and no more. Remember 
that C2 puts a value of $20 on the product and faces hacking costs of $50. Microsoft is 
going to build the software for the C1s of the world and there is no marginal cost to put a 
copy in C2’s hands. We gain C2’s value if we can eliminate the hacking costs so we 
should spend up to $20 to do that. 
Mandatory insurance would get Microsoft to do that. Unfortunately, as set out in the 
first example, C2 will take the software period, and won’t internalize the costs of that de-
cision. So with mandatory insurance, Microsoft will have an incentive to overspend on 
quality, to invest up to $50 to eliminate C2’s hacking costs. What we would really like, 
socially, is for Microsoft to spend up to $20 to eliminate the hacking costs and for C2 to 
stop buying the software if it costs more than $20 to eliminate those hacking costs. That 
is the first-best outcome but mandatory insurance doesn’t get us there. 
At least in this framework, unbundling the insurance and allowing Microsoft to offer 
insurance on a voluntary basis doesn’t accomplish anything. No C1 would buy insurance 
and Microsoft would not sell C2 insurance for less than $50. You can’t pool risk without 
more types than we have in this example. 
C. Timing of Software Release and Adoption 
When should Microsoft release software? When should a consumer adopt new soft-
ware? How do the liability and warranty rules matter for these decisions? To build off of 
the prior example for just a bit, instead of imagining that Microsoft faces an initial design 
choice, think of Microsoft as learning about its software over time through use by con-
sumers. So a sufficient amount of use during period 1 means that Microsoft can redesign 
the software for use in period 2. We know of course that this tracks actual practice: Mi-
crosoft releases service packs for Office and Windows. We face a real design question 
here, a trade off between internal and external testing costs and about the nature of learn-
ing, whether simulated use is good substitute for actual use. 
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In a basic sense, this is a question of the optimal time to release a product, where we 
might think that software has at least two distinctive features (at least as compared to an 
exploding Coke bottle). First, we think that we will learn about the product through con-
sumer use. We may learn a bit about Coke bottles in consumer hands, but we should 
think that we will learn vastly more about a given piece of software as end-users explore 
the full set of possibilities inherent in software. So we should think that the scope of 
learning is much greater for software. Second, software can be modified after the fact at 
very little cost. Said again, software is continuous while physical products are lumpy and 
discrete. Once the Coke bottle is in my hands, Coca-Cola can alter it after-the-fact only at 
high-cost. Think of the burdens associated with recalls of physical products for retrofit-
ting. In contrast, software could be adjusted across the network while in place. The learn-
ing associated with software and its installed malleability should push towards earlier 
product release compared to physical goods.65 
To just focus on learning, suppose that Microsoft will learn from period 1 use how to 
eliminate C2’s hacking costs and that from that learning, it can eliminate those costs at a 
cost of $1. Period 1 use saves us $9 in reduced design costs compared to the $10 that 
could have been spent in period 1 to eliminate C2’s hacking costs. 
Now we can look at insurance a little differently. A no-insurance approach helps to 
segregate and sequence adoption by end-users. Consumers who anticipate deriving sub-
stantial net benefits from the product adopt early, conferring a use externality on those 
who wait. These guinea pigs pay a higher price for the software—higher in the form of 
bearing first-period hacking costs that will be eliminated for second-period users. Absent 
the insurance, we end up with a form of price discrimination. 
Indeed, the story gets even better. We don’t see Microsoft selling two versions of 
Windows—one with bugs and one without—simultaneously. But this is close to what we 
see occurring over time (OK, perhaps with many bugs and fewer bugs). Selling different 
quality software at different time separates the market and makes it possible to make the 
                                                 
65 A more formal analysis of these issues would look to the burgeoning literature on real options, which makes 
timing and the costs and benefits associated with delay central to its analysis. See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit and Robert S. 
Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton Univ. Press, 1994). Products liability policy almost certainly needs 
to take into account these critical questions regarding the optimal time at which to release products. 
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socially-sensible investment in reducing hacking costs that couldn’t occur in the one-
period version of the model above. 
To see this, imagine this path for use and sales. Microsoft anticipates selling one ver-
sion of the software today, and a second improved version tomorrow. Microsoft spends 
$50, builds Windows and announces a $5 per copy price and sells without insurance. C1s 
buy today—an assumption for now and an important issue below—and get a benefit of 
$195. No entrant can offer them a better deal. C2 doesn’t buy today, as the buggy soft-
ware is a bad deal for it. The next period, Microsoft invests $1 in a service pack for the 
software. Microsoft raises the purchase price for Windows to $6 and C2 buys, with a net 
benefit to C2 of $14. 
Why didn’t Microsoft just spend the $10 in the first period to eliminate the bugs? 
Two reasons. First, we saved $9 in quality improvement costs in using the software in the 
first period. Whether that makes sense depends on C2’s discount rate, as C2 only gets the 
software in the second period. But, second, and more importantly, we avoid the defect-
ing-coalition problem that we saw above. Were Microsoft to spend the extra $10 on Win-
dows in the first period and sell the bug-free version to all, it would charge $6 to every-
body. An entrant could produce the buggy version for $50 and sell nine copies to the C1s 
for $5.55 a piece, and the C1s would defect. 
By selling different quality software at different times, it is possible to support the in-
cremental expenditure on quality. Once the C1s have purchased, they can’t defect to a 
competitor. The purchases by the C1s create the learning that reduces the costs of im-
proving the software. With mandatory insurance, C2 would have no incentive to internal-
ize the costs of early adoption of the software. 
We have relied on consumer heterogeneity—C2 differs from C1—to get the results 
we have seen so far. If consumers are identical, then we may confront a waiting problem, 
where each consumer waits for another consumer to adopt first. Put differently, users 
may believe that there is a second-mover advantage to software adoption. Or, more jar-
gon, we may have a prisoner’s dilemma in software adoption, where each person wants 
the other guy to go first and no one adopts the software. Insurance, voluntary or manda-
tory, would help to solve the second-mover problem. 
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How would this work? Suppose that consumers are identical. In choosing whether to 
adopt new software today or tomorrow, consumers should compare the net benefits today 
against the discounted benefits of adoption tomorrow. The key point here is that costs 
tomorrow depend on the number of adoptions today, where the greater the number of 
adopters, the lower the costs. 
Insurance reduces the costs of adoption today. We could imagine a partial insurance 
scheme, as the learning that emerges from use may not require all consumers. We should 
want an insurance scheme that incurs just enough costs today to learn enough to lower 
the costs of adoption tomorrow. Note that that won’t happen with mandatory insurance. 
Partial insurance might be implemented by insuring only a fraction of the customers or 
by insuring only a fraction of the harms. 
III. Conclusion 
The wonder of the Internet is incredibly capable computers connected with each other 
under the control of individuals. For all of the reasons that we think that decentralization 
is a powerful force we have applauded the ability of individual users to set up websites 
and make their ideas available to others. But there is a dark side as well. Always-on con-
nections, extra computing cycles and gigabytes of storage to burn mean that individual 
decisions can propagate throughout the network quickly. The small-worlds phenomenon 
that is the Internet means that my computer is only a handful of clicks away from a mali-
cious computer programmer. 
My decisions matter for your computing life. A malicious hacker can turn my com-
puter into a zombie and use my broadband connection and my computer to shut down 
websites, to send millions of spam emails, or worse. The network is a sea of computing 
externalities, many extraordinarily positive but others that can range from everyday both-
ersome to enormously disruptive. And, in the hands of a cyber-terrorist, the more we em-
bed critical infrastructure into the public network, the more we make it possible for a cy-
ber-terrorist to turns our computing resources against us and thereby harm critical infra-
structure, such as the electricity grid or our communications networks. 
Addressing cyber security is a mixed question of engineering—computing architec-
ture—and legal rules. The zombie PC problem emerges with the rise of the Internet and 
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decentralized control over PCs. The pricing structure of the Internet world—one-price, 
all-you-can-eat broadband and lumpy computing power in the form of powerful CPUs—
kills off many of the natural incentives for an individual to ensure that her computing re-
sources are not being used by others. This can be good, as it creates many opportunities 
for sharing, but the downside is that there is little reason for the individual computer user 
to police against zombification. 
We need to look for mechanisms, architectural or legal, to boost cyber security. Ob-
viously, we will always pursue cyber-terrorists, but we want to take steps before cyber-
terror takes place. We could consider actions targeted at individuals, perhaps legal ac-
tions for negligent computer set-up or computer operation, or more centralized ap-
proaches to kicking poorly-configured machines off of the network. We might enlist 
Internet service providers, original equipment manufacturers or software producers in 
those efforts. 
But I don’t consider those issues here. Instead, in this article, I have considered two 
issues in detail. The monoculture argument is one approach to architecting the network. 
That argument suggests that we should focus on forcing heterogeneity in operating sys-
tems to enhance our cyber security. I think that is the wrong emphasis. On its own terms, 
the argument tells us little about the extent of diversity that would be required to achieve 
meaningful protection, especially if our concern is the cyber-terrorist. The argument also 
ignores the more important question of adaptability, meaning how quickly can the current 
system adapt to new conditions. Instead, I argue in favor of the traditional approach of 
isolation—autarky—in separating critical infrastructure from the public network. 
Second, I consider the way in which liability rules for software might influence the 
quality of software and software use decisions. Hackers can exploit defects in software to 
seize control of machines. Fewer defects to exploit and we might reduce the harms of 
hackers. This turns out to be tricky. Broad liability rules that would protect consumers 
from the harms of hacking will lead to the standard moral hazard problem that we see in 
insurance. Consumers who shouldn’t be using computers or on the network will jump on 
once they are protected from hacking losses. 
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These are standard products liability issues, but software has two particular features 
that suggest that we should not just apply our standard approaches to products liability. 
First, we learn about software through use. One piece of software is combined with other 
software in a way that a Coke bottle is rarely combined with anything else. Second, soft-
ware can adapt and can be fixed in place after-the-fact. Both of these features should 
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